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Abstract
After 14 years of unconscionable wrath against local civilians, including enforced
recruitment of thousands of child soldiers, the rebel group The Lord’s Resistance Army (“LRA”)
was offered amnesty by the Ugandan government in 2000. However, as the conflict continued
unabated, the Ugandan government, for the first time in the history of the Court, referred its case
to the International Criminal Court (“ICC”). The ICC Prosecutor announced the beginning of an
investigation and issued warrants for seven top LRA officers in October of 2005. The potential
ICC prosecution raises many questions about the jurisdiction of the new court, including whether
the Court should defer to national amnesty programs. Some experts argue that a rigid criminal
prosecution can prolong a conflict, exacerbates the suffering of the country’s citizens, and
diminishes the value of future amnesties as peace-building tools. Critics of amnesties, on the
other hand, contend that honoring amnesties promotes a culture of impunity and contravenes the
obligation of states to prosecute perpetrators of serious international crimes. This Comment
holds that although Uganda’s amnesty act falls short of the complementarity requirements of
Article 17 of the Rome Statute, an analysis of its shortcomings illuminates how a post-conflict
state under amnesty legislation can structure an amnesty program that may satisfy Rome Statute
requirements. Accordingly, this tradegy presents an opportunity for the ICC and Ugandans to
create a template for national amnesty programs, in conjunction with truth commissions, that
could both honor the state obligation to prosecute grave crimes while simultaneously preserving
the integrity of future amnesty grants.
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Introduction
In 1788 Alexander Hamilton wrote:
“In seasons of insurrection or rebellion, there are often critical moments, when a welltimed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquility of the
commonwealth; and which, if suffered to pass unimproved, it may never be possible
afterwards to recall.”1
Hamilton’s words assert the value of amnesties in internal conflicts.2 Over 200 years
later, however, granting amnesties is considerably more complex; with the passage of the Rome
Statute, national amnesties now must withstand international legal scrutiny.3
The Lord’s Resistance Army (“LRA”), a rebel group belonging to the Acholi tribe of
northern Uganda, has waged a brutal war against the Ugandan government for almost 20 years.4
The LRA’s political beginnings date from 1986, after a five-year guerilla war between the
ethnically-divided north and south, when a southern president, Yoweri Museveni, took power.5
As the country’s power shifted dramatically to the south, Museveni’s call for all Acholi soldiers
to report to the barracks aroused suspicion, causing many Acholi to flee north into Sudan to form
an armed resistance against the government in power.6
During nineteen years of wrath, the LRA committed countless atrocities against the
civilian population of northern Uganda, including torture and mutilation, abduction, sexual
violence, forced recruitment, and murder of suspected government supporters.7 The LRA also
has engaged in widespread abduction of children; some estimate that LRA rebels have abducted
more than 20,000 children, forcing boys to fight as soldiers and girls to serve as sex slaves.8
This campaign of terror resulted in over 1.6 million internally displaced persons who now inhabit
squalid and dangerous shantytowns.9
In an effort to quell the violence, the Ugandan government passed the Amnesty Act in
January of 2000.10 Many considered the amnesty program a success because it encouraged more
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than 15,000 rebels to surrender by June 2005.11 The conflict, however, continued to rage,12
leading to Uganda’s referral to the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), pursuant to Article 14
of the Rome Statute.13 On July 29, 2004, ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo found a
reasonable basis to investigate Joseph Kony, the LRA’s self-proclaimed spiritual leader, and
other LRA officers.14 In response, Acholi leaders, fearing that the investigation and possible
prosecution would aggravate the peace process, traveled to The Hague to plead with the ICC to
suspend investigations.15 Nevertheless, on October 14, 2005, the ICC issued warrants for the
arrest of Kony and six other top LRA leaders.16
Uganda’s ICC referral raises critical questions concerning when the Court should defer to
national prosecutions, truth and reconciliation campaigns, and amnesty programs.17 Some legal
scholars argue that an unrelenting insistence on criminal prosecution where there is an amnesty
in place prolongs a conflict, exacerbates the suffering of the country’s citizens, aggravates the
community’s healing and educational needs, and diminishes the value of future amnesties as
peace-building tools.18 Critics of national amnesties respond that honoring amnesties promotes a
culture of impunity – effectively “send[ing] a message” to potentialbrutal regime l eaders that
they have nothing to lose by instituting repressive measures against their own populations.19
Textually, the Rome Statute does not foreclose the possibility of deferring to amnesties
and alternative justice mechanisms when they are in the “interests of justice.”20 However,
although customary international law does not yet forbid amnesty grants for international
crimes,21 it appears to be moving in this direction.22 Because the ICC has yet to adjudicate upon
the tension between its jurisdiction and a national amnesty grant, the efforts of the Prosecutor
and the Court in Ugandawill likely have potent ramifications in future ICC cases. 23
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Part I of this comment explores the effectiveness and legitimacy of prior amnesty
programs,24 discusses the basic structure of the Ugandan Amnesty Act,25 and provides an
overview to provisions of the Rome Statute that implicate national amnesty programs.26 Part II
attempts to reconcile the justice interests of the Rome Statue and the practical goals of the
Ugandan amnesty.27 Part III offers recommendations for prosecuting perpetrators in the
Ugandan conflict while preserving the integrity of amnesties, thereby building a viable precedent
for future cases.28
I.

Background
A.

Pre-ICC International Jurisprudence

While international treaty law seems to necessitate criminal prosecutions for certain
serious crimes,29 it also appears to provide legal encouragement for amnesties in certain
contexts.30 The legitimacy of national amnesties under customary international law is equally
ambiguous and vigorously debated.31 Thus, analysis of past judicial oversight of national
amnesties provides needed guidance in future cases.
1.

South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission

South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (“TRC”) illustratedt he
instrumental value of amnesties in the truth-discovery process.32 The South African government
authorized the TRC’s Amnesty Committee to grant amnesty to perpetrators who had provided
full disclosure of the facts of their crimes.33 Widely acclaimed for its success in providing
national reconciliation, the TRC amnesty program proved to be an valuable mechanism in
determining responsibility for human rights abuses.34 Two features of the TRC amnesty grant
were crucial to its success: it was granted conditionally and only on the basis of individualized
application.35
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2.

The Special Court of Sierra Leone and the Lomé Amnesty Act

In 1999, the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court of Sierra Leone held that the amnesty
provision in the Lomé Peace Agreement cannot deprive an international court, such as the
Special Court, of jurisdiction over crimes against humanity and war crimes.36 Therefore, Sierra
Leone could not legally declare an amnesty for “crimes under international law that are subject
of universal jurisdiction.”37 Notably, the Appeals Chamber declared that granting amnesty is a
“breach of an obligation of the State towards the international community as a whole.”38
3.

Mitigating Sentencing Factors of the ICTY and ICTR

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) developed sentencing factors which may
become relevant to potential international prosecution in which a perpetrator has surrendered and
submitted to the terms of an amnesty legislation.39 Potential mitigating factors for perpetrators
include participation in the acts of mercy and assistance to victims,40 public expression of
remorse and contrition,41 voluntary surrender,42 and cooperation with the Prosecutor.43
However, ad hoc tribunals also considered aggravating factors to a sentence, such as overall
gravity of the crime, willingness of participation, membership in extreme organizations, degree
of suffering and harm caused to victims, means of killing, crimes that victimize civilians or the
young, and the perpetrator’s leadership position.44
B. The Ugandan Amnesty Act of 2000
In order to encourage LRA combatants to abandon the insurgency, Uganda passed the
Amnesty Act45 on January 21, 2000, which led to over 15,000 amnesty grants to surrendering
combatants who had engaged in armed rebellion against the government since 1986 and who
agreed to renounce and abandon the insurgency.46 With a broad mandate to promote
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reconciliation, the Act suggested the possibility of instituting a truth-seeking justice
mechanism.47
Although many foot soldiers – primarily abducted children -- defected, critics viewed the
amnesty as a failure because it did not lead to the surrender of LRA leadership or result in the
end of the conflict.48 The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights called for a renunciation
of amnesty for LRA leadership accused of serious crimes such as murder, enslavement, torture,
rape, and sexual slavery.49 In its referral to the ICC, Uganda decided to pursue the
Commissioner’s policy and withdrew its offer of amnesty to those high-ranking LRA leaders
whom the Prosecutor had indicted.50
Based on reports that government combatants, the United Peoples’ Defence Forces
(“UPDF”), committed serious crimes against the civilian population, outside observers criticized
Uganda’s referral to the ICC for political selectivity.51 However, in its referral, Museveni agreed
to allow the ICC to investigate and prosecute UPDF officials and combatants.52
C. The Rome Statute
With respect to national amnesties, the Rome Statute is textually silent and open to
interpretation.53 The preamble of the Rome Statute appears hostile to amnesties for crimes listed
in the Statute54 while later provisions, notably Article 53, appear to provide the scope for
sophisticated, well-tailored amnesty programs.55
1.

Article 17

Article 17 of the Rome Statute regulates issues of admissibility for the Court.56
Specifically, it represents the important principle of “complementarity” – that individual states
have the first opportunity to prosecute offenders in their jurisdiction.57 The most salient
provision to non-prosecutorial situations, Article 17(1)(b) sets strict requirements for the Court to
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recognize alternative judicial proceedings, requiring the state to have investigated the case,
decided not to prosecute, and that its decision did not result “from the unwillingness or inability
of the State genuinely to prosecute.”58 Article 17(2)(a) provides guidance for interpreting the
“unwillingness” exception of 17(1)(b), allowing admissibility where domestic proceedings are
“made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility.”59
2.

Article 53

Article 53(1)(c) of the Rome Statute allows the Prosecutor to decline prosecution when:
“[taking] into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of the victims, there are
nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the
interests of justice.”60
Thus the Prosecutor has discretion not to initiate an investigation if it would be inconsistent with
the “interests of justice.”61 Experts disagree as to whether the existence of an amnesty program
would fit within the parameters of prosecutorial discretion in the “interests of justice.”62
The ICC Prosecutor also must consider the “interest of victims” when making judgments
of who and when to prosecute.63 The relevance of both the “interests of justice” and the
“interests of victims” reflects an emerging new order that international justice must engage both
victims and perpetrators.64 A recent cooperative survey of victims in northern Uganda found
that, in order to accept amnesty grantees back into the community, a majority of those
surveyed(56%) would require an apology, while a significant percentage (34%) would demand
confession.65 This information, revealing the true “interests of the victims,” could be factored
into the Prosecutor’s consideration of potential prosecutorial targets.66
Article 53(2)(c) compels the Prosecutor to consider the “gravity of the crime.”67 Human
Rights Watch has suggested certain considerations to measure gravity of the crimes: the amount
of premeditation, the extent of the crimes, the number of victims, suffering of the victims, and
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the heinous means of the crimes.68 Article 53(2)(c) also requires the ICC Prosecutor to “[take]
into account the age and infirmity of the alleged perpetrator,” ostensibly creating an exception
for children, elderly, and drug-influenced combatants.69
II.

Analysis
The potential conflict between the Ugandan Amnesty Act and the Rome Statute will

likely prove challenging for the Court to decide by simple black-letter legal analysis.70 Both
Article 17 and Article 53 indicate that the Prosecutor and the ICC must interpret justice
broadly.71 In particular, the broad language of Article 53(2)(c) appears to require policy
analysis, effectively allowing, or indeed instructing, the Prosecutor to consider the consequences
of investigative and prosecutorial choices.72 However, it could be argued that Article 17 limits
this prosecutorial discretion since Article 53(1)(c) and 53(2)(c) allow the Prosecutor to consider
Article 17 inadmissibility criteria in deciding whether to investigate or prosecute a case.73
A.

Uganda’s Amnesty Act Would Not Pass the
Complementarity Requirement of Article 17

While flexibility to find a case inadmissible under Article 17 is limited,74 the Court could
nevertheless consider well-tailored alternative approaches that meet strict requirements.75
Therefore, only national amnesties that are individually investigative, conditional, and
potentially prosecutorial could conceivably pass the complementarity requirement of Article
17.76 Although the Amnesty Act clearly falls far short of this requirement,77 an analysis of its
shortcomings illuminates how a post-conflict state under amnesty legislation can structure an
amnesty program/truth commission to potentially satisfy the complementarity requirement of
Article 17.
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1.

Uganda’s Amnesty Act Would Not Meet the Complementarity
Requirements of Article 17 Because it Does Not Provide for Individual
Investigations

The plain language of Article 17(1)(b), allowing the Court to find a case inadmissible
when “[t]he case has been investigated by a State,” implies that the Courtcan only defer to
amnesties when there has been an individual investigation into the facts of a case.78 Robust
investigations may also refute an “unwillingness” determination under Article 17(2)(a) that the
decision was made to shield offenders from criminal responsibility as it suggests that amnesty
seekers are individually taking responsibility for their actions.79 An issue open to debate,
however, is whether the Court will interpret “investigation,” as a conventional criminal
investigation, or adopt a broader approach, and read “investigation” to include good-faith,
methodical evidence-gathering.80 Uganda’s amnesty program would certainly fail both standards
because it does not provide for any inquiry consistent with typical criminal investigations.81
2.

Uganda’s Amnesty Act Would Not Meet the Complementarity
Requirements of Article 17 Because it is Not Conditional

Article 17(2)(a) instructs the Court to determine “unwillingness,” and find a case
admissible if it appears that purpose of the national proceedings, or the decision not to prosecute,
is to “[shield] the person concerned from criminal responsibility.”82 This provision seems to
require conditionality; an amnesty grant contingent on the applicant providing something of
community value, as in a “compelling state interest” such as full confession, apology, or
financial restitution, may counter contentions of intentional protection of the offender.83
Accordingly, Uganda’s Amnesty Act would fall short of Article 17’s admissibility test because
its principal requirement is a pre- existing legal duty – ceasing hostilities.84 Since the amnesty
should remain contingent on the particularities of each state,85 a valid Ugandan amnesty program
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would require a community benefit based on Ugandans’ stated opinions, such as confessing
wrongdoing or apologizing.86
3.

Uganda’s Amnesty Act Would Not Meet the Complementarity
Requirements of Article 17 Because it is Not Potentially Prosecutorial

Article 17(1)(b)’s post-investigation requirement that “a State has decided not to
prosecute” suggests that there must be a prosecutorial option available to the decision-maker to
meet the complementarity regime.87 Accordingly, Uganda’s Amnesty Act fails this requirement
because it lacks any prosecutorial mechanism to adjudicate putative amnesty seekers in criminal
proceedings.88 One may attempt to characterize amnesty legislation as a “decision” not to
prosecute under Article 17(1)(b).89 However, even if the Court were to deem the Amnesty Act a
“decision” for Article 17 purposes, it may find it nevertheless fails the complementarity
requirement of Article 17(1)(b) because it resulted from an “inability” to prosecute, since the
legislation effectively barred prosecution.90 Furthermore, the Court could also find the Ugandan
amnesty “decision” admissible because the Act was a decision based on an “unwillingness” of
the Ugandan government to install genuine criminal trials, in that its stated purpose of peace and
reconciliation could only be accomplished by shielding offenders from criminal responsibility.91
B.

Article 17 Expressly Limits the
Prosecutor to All but theMost Serious Offenses

A general policy of respecting truth commission amnesties, except for a small number of
the most serious cases, would be consistent with the mandate of Article 17 and Article 53 for the
Court and the Prosecutor to consider the “gravity of the crime.”92 The Preamble of the Rome
Statute declares that “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a
whole must not go unpunished.”93 While emphasizing the imperative to prosecute the most
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serious crimes, this provision also provides further scope for prosecutorial discretion in
considering the gravity of the crime.94
Because prosecutorial resources are sparse in Uganda, and the number of atrocities are so
numerous, significant discretion within the Ugandan judicial system seems inevitable.95
Furthermore, consideration of the gravity of the offense provides flexibility to prosecute those
who played major roles in recruiting child soldiers, a grave offense indeed given the great
number of children abducted by the LRA.96 In practice, with Kony’s cult-like control over the
rebels and the terror-induced but tenuous participation of forcibly-recruited child soldiers,
isolating LRA’ top leaders through arrest may result in a quick collapse of the rebel group.97
There is much debate whether to require international accountability under the Rome
Statute for perpetrators who capitulated pursuant to amnesty legislation, or to a future truth
commission amnesty.98 Critically, the value of amnesties would diminish if the Prosecutor could
prosecute even those perpetrators to whom a truth commission had already granted amnesty.99
Accordingly, with the exception of offenders of serious international crimes, selecting cases to
prosecute among those that have either failed to apply for amnesty or those whose amnesty
applications have been rejected would be consistent with the Rome Statute and would preserve
the integrity of amnesty programs.100
Some experts who believe that accommodating amnesties may in fact aggravate enduring
peace have suggested that the international community's amnesty grant to Turkish officials
accused of planning massacres of Armenians during World War I tacitly emboldened Adolf
Hitler to engineer the Holocaust with impunity.101 However, if a comparable gross violation of
human rights like the Holocaust were to occur today, Article 17’s mandate for ICC prosecution
of those most responsible for the gravest of crimes would preclude any immunity of high-level
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officials and preserve the vital deterrent effect.102 Thus, this argument fails to fully appreciate
the flexible reach of the Rome Statute and its ability to accommodate both justice and peace
concerns.103
C.

A General Policy of Respecting
Amnesties Would Serve the “Interests of Justice”

The Rome Statute appears to foreclose the possibility that unconditional amnesties should
bar ICC prosecution of perpetrators of serious crimes.104 However, Article 53 gives the Court
and the Prosecutor flexibility to defer prosecution to uphold the “interests of justice.”105
Specifically, Article 53 links justice principles to specific parameters, including the “gravity of
the crime,” the “interests of victims,” and the “age or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator.”
Accordingly, justice, and the possibility of ICC prosecution, must be bound to case-related
considerations.106
Justice and amnesty can act as complementary, mutually reinforcing forces.107
Conditional amnesties provide incentive for both victims108 – who will likely be attracted to the
prospect of receiving financial consideration – and perpetrators109 – who seek to avoid
prosecution – to reconcile. Amnesties founded upon reconciliatory principles and featuring
restorative mechanisms, such as South Africa’s TRC amnesty program, can promote justice by
redressing a balance through the vindication and restoration of victims.110 Conversely,
prosecution is necessary to make the threat of punishment credible, and encourages combatants
to apply for amnesty.111 In Uganda, where the LRA will be the subject to most investigations,
honoring amnesties given to LRA combatants would likely bear reconciliatory benefits by
rendering the process less one-sided.112
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The “interests of justice” calculus of Article 53 may also provide scope to for the
Prosecutor to consider practical limitations in post-conflict states.113 Although the Appeals
Chamber of the Special Court of Sierra Leone opined that no amnesty grant should bar
prosecution for international crimes,114 due to the limited resources of the Special Court, some
argued that the Prosecutor gave it virtual de facto approval.115 The Special Court, in its
declarations on core principles of customary international law, may haveunderestimated
practical constraints in transitional states.116 This paradoxical result certainly will be relevant to
the ICC’s investigation and possible prosecution in Uganda, which will be hampered by similar
logistical and financial limitations.117
D.

A Ugandan Complementary Truth Commission Would Serve
Both the“Interest of Justice” and the “Interests of the Victims”

As stated above, it would be difficult for a truth commission procedure to satisfy the
complementary requirements of Article 17.118 At first glance, Article 17’s strict test suggests
that a case before a truth commission will likely remain admissible before the ICC.119 Indeed,
the Court may find a case admissible even if the state has investigated and decided not to
prosecute, as long as it meets the “unwillingness” requirement of Article 17(2).120 However, it is
possible that a well-tailored truth commission with similar characteristics to a criminal trial may
allow the Prosecutor to find the case inadmissible.121
If the Court finds a case has failed the complementarity requirements of Article 17, the
state could nevertheless argue that prosecutorial discretion, under the broader “interests of
justice” analysis of Article 53(2)(c), should preclude ICC prosecution.122 In Uganda, alternative
justice proponents may maintain, truth commissions can further strengthen the “interests of the
victims” of Uganda’s civil war.123 Thus, Article 53 is the most significant mechanism whereby
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the Prosecutor could accord deference to alternative reconciliation measures in Uganda, or
another post-conflict state.124
Ideally, truth commissions serve the “interests of the victims” because they reduce the
likelihood of provoking offenders into resuming hostilities in the future.125 Further, it is often
only through accounts of the war crime perpetrators themselves that families of victims can
determine the circumstances and location of their loved ones’ deaths.126 Indeed, the prospect of
conditional amnesty within a truth commission encourages both surrender and confession.127 A
system of predominantly criminal trials, in contrast, may have a disempowering effect on victims
when such trials deny them an opportunity to tell their complete story.128
A truth commission may also serve the “interests of victims” by complementing the
prosecutorial mechanisms of the ICC and Ugandan judicial system to create a symbiotic
collaborative framework.129 A system in which trials are reserved only for serious crimes,
allowing truth commissions to settle most disputes, provides accountability for past abuses while
also creating a historical record to ensure thatthe same mistakes are not repeated in the future.130
Finally, a truth commission would be especially crucial to the “interests of justice” in
Uganda, where the number of child soldiers is overwhelming, by providing an appropriate forum
in which to resolve cases involving child combatants.131 Article 53(2)(c) appears to instruct the
ICC prosecutor to use caution when considering prosecution of young and drug-influenced
combatants.132 Prosecuting children and infirm combatants, even if they have committed serious
crimes, may be contrary to the “interests of justice,” and thus outside the reach of ICC
prosecution.133
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E.

ICC Rules of Procedure and Recent International Practice Suggest that the
ICC Has the Authority to Consider Sentence Mitigation for Amnesty Holders

Consideration of an offender’s surrender to a legitimate amnesty program as a mitigating
sentencing factor provides an appropriate compromise between peace and justice necessities and
is consistent with the ICC’s founding principles.134 The ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence
includes the sentencing factor of “subsequent conduct” of the perpetrator.135 Thus, even the
capitulation of perpetrators of international crimes pursuant to an amnesty agreement would
seem to warrant judicial consideration of sentence mitigation in order to encourage other serious
offenders to surrender.136
The practices of recent ad hoc courts further supports the legitimacy of mitigating
sentences for perpetrators that surrender or otherwise cooperate with the prosecution by
accepting an amnesty’s terms.137 However, when aggravating circumstances are sufficiently
compelling, they may outweigh mitigating factors.138 This balancing test presents difficulties in
Uganda, as those LRA members whose surrender is most vital to peace likely have severe
aggravating factors, given the appalling nature of the crimes, the undeniable suffering inflicted
on victims, and their high positions of authority in the LRA.139 Accordingly, the incentive to
surrender under an amnesty deal would evaporate if high-level perpetrators were to face the risk
of unmitigated, or indeed aggravated, post-capitulation sentencing.140
III. Recommendations
The ICC Prosecutor’s task of balancing the demands of justice and peace during an ongoing conflict, within the scope of an ambiguous statute, will not be easy.141 The most
promising solution will hinge on a three-pronged prosecutorial approach involving the ICC,
meaningful national prosecutions, and truth commissions.142 Beyond offenders who have
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committed a grave international crime, the Ugandan judicial system should select cases from
individuals who failed to apply for amnesty or those amnesty applicants whose application a
Ugandan truth commission or court has rejected.143
A.

Uganda and the ICC Must Collaborate to
Create an Integrated and Effective Criminal Justice System

First, the ICC must prosecute, amnesty or not, those perpetrators of the most serious
international crimes,144 absent special circumstances.145 Criminal punishment is especially
critical for those most responsible for serious international crimes, in order to honor the victims,
uphold fundamental values of accountability, and deter potential ringleaders elsewhere.146
Second, because a lack of resources will limit ICC prosecutions to only a few of the most
egregious offenders, it is critical that the Ugandan government pursue lesser violations by both
LRA and UPDF offenders.147 Unlike South Africa, the Ugandan government must vigorously
prosecute those who failed to seek, or those who were denied, amnesty.148 Finally, the
international community must provide financial support, in the form of donations, as well as
logistical assistance, to ensure that Uganda has adequate resources to bring all serious
perpetrators to justice.149
B.

Uganda Must Create an Amnesty-Granting
Truth and Reconciliation Commission

The Ugandan government should institute a truth commission with the power to grant
amnesties.150 Further, it should require perpetrators who voluntarily surrender under an amnesty
grant to appear at such a truth commission.151 The truth commissions, however, must not be
mere smokescreens thatshield wrongdoers from prosecution. 152 Due to the concern that
allowing a truth commission to pass evidence collected in the course of its own work to the ICC
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may discourage cooperation, the ICC Prosecutor should prohibit the use of such evidence for the
indictment of alleged perpetrators.153 Lastly, in order to avoid an “unwillingness” determination
under Article 17(2)(c), Uganda must ensure that the truth commissions are composed of an
impartial, independent, and diverse group of Ugandans, thus including Acholi leaders.154
C.

Uganda Should Create an Amnesty
Program Which Would Satisfy Article 17’s Complementarity Requirements

In order to institute an amnesty program that meets the complementarity requirements of
Article 17, Uganda must ensure that it is individualized, which will becrucial to counter the
perception that only the LRA were guilty of crimes and allow accountability for UPDF
soldiers.155 Second, consistent with the TRC model, amnesty should be conditional, so that the
amnesty seeker must pay for his forgiveness in a manner according with the will of the local
community.156 This would localize the reconciliation process and empower local Ugandans by
offering an opportunity to name the price of their own forgiveness.157 Based on a recent survey,
the truth commission should strongly consider requiring perpetrators to confess, apologize, and
provide restitution to victims, if possible.158 Finally, the truth commission must reserve the
option of referring any case to either the ICC or Ugandan national courts if the offender does not
satisfactorily fulfill the amnesty requirements.159
D.

The ICC and the Ugandan Judicial System Must
Exercise Discretion when Prosecuting Children

Due to children’s undeveloped concept of intent and awareness, providing justice in cases
of child soldiers demands a different prosecutorial paradigm.160 First, for those children under
eighteen, the ICC should encourage hearings in separate juvenile chambers or truth commission
proceedings.161 Given the staggering percentage of children in LRA’s forces, settling cases
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involving children in truth commissions would significantly alleviate the strain on Uganda’s
criminal justice system.162 Second, the Prosecutor should assign a specialist in children's rights
issues to investigate crimes of child recruitment.163 Lastly, amnesty grants must not foreclose
prosecution of those whom the Prosecutor suspects of recruiting child soldiers, which would
send a potent message to other regimes that seek children as combatants that such practice is
intolerable to the international community.164
E.

The ICC Should Allow Mitigated
Sentences For Those Perpetrators that
Surrender by Complying with the Demands of the Amnesty

Finally, to encourage a peaceful resolution to the conflict, the Court should consider
mitigating sentences for perpetrators of even the most serious crimes.165 To preserve the
necessary incentive of an amnesty deal and reduce uncertainty as to the result of surrender, the
ICC should give substantial weight to the mitigating factor of voluntarysurrender , in addition to
other aggravating and mitigating factors.166 Further, the ICC must improve and clarify its
message to local communities, including the LRA, so allUgandans are aware of the rewards of
reconciliation and amnesty, as well as the extent of amnesty coverage.167 Without such
information, insurgent combatants may hesitate to surrender if they fear that they would still be
susceptible to prosecution.168
Conclusion
Although amnesties are generally a political tool for quelling conflicts, with the passage
of the Rome Statute, they now must pass more rigid international legal muster.169 The Statute
instructs the Prosecutor and the Court to strike a balance between the restorative needs of
transitional societies and international demands of criminal prosecution.170 Accordingly, the ICC
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must proceed with caution before eroding the value of national amnesties.171 Ugandans and ICC
officers now have the opportunity to create a future template for an effective dual approach in
post-conflict states, combining threats of ICC prosecution with a peace-building national
amnesty program.172 The ICC’s determination of the Prosecutor’s reach in Uganda will shape
the practical workings of the Rome Statute in relation to national amnesties, and carry powerful
precedent in future ICC cases.173
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conflicts are more real than theoretical, involving "fundamental question[s] of policy with farreaching implications for the international human rights program and the maintenance of public
order”).
71

See Stahn, supra note 55, at 698 (arguing that the express distinction in the language of Article

53(2)(c) – based on “all the circumstances, including” – suggests that the “interests of justice”
may provide for a broad concept of justice, allowing a departure from traditional prosecution).
72

See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 53(2) (mandating the ICC Prosecutor, in determining what

perpetrator to sue, consider the “interests of justice,” “all the circumstances,” “the gravity of the
crime,” and “the interests of the victims”); see also Arsanjani, supra note 4, at 66 (noting that
legal experts cannot analyze the jurisdiction of the ICC by mere legal analysis as such questions
involve fundamental policy issues with salient implications for human rights efforts, and local
politics).
73

See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 53(1)(b), (c) (instructing the Prosecutor to consider

whether the case would be admissible under Article 17 when determining whether to initiate an
investigation or prosecution); see also Stahn, supra note 55, at 717 (arguing that due to Article 17
constraints, Article 53’s allowance of broad prosecutorial discretion is in fact not as broad as
many believe).
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74

See Stahn, supra note 55, at 709 (introducing two limiting elements of Article 17: an initial

presumption in favor of admissibility, and a high threshold for inadmissibility for cases in which
admissibility is in question).
75

See Robinson, supra note 57, at 502 (noting that for the Court to allow alternative methods of

justice, the procedure must be qualitatively similar to genuine prosecution).
76

See Stahn, supra note 55, at 711-12 (arguing that a state could satisfy Article 17

complementarity requirements when alternative justice forums can recommend prosecution
following proceedings, while reserving the authority to deny amnesties after a complete factual
investigation).
77

See Amnesty Act, supra note 10, pt. 2 (granting immunity to all perpetrators, without requiring

offenders to state their crime or performing investigative function).
78

See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17(1)(b); see also Stahn, supra note 55, at 710 (observing

that the underlying principle of Article 17 is that amnesties must be accompanied by some
inquiry mechanisms into the crime of the putative offender).
79

See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17(1)(b), 17(2)(a); see also Jeremy Sarkin & Erin Daly,

Too Many Questions, Too Few Answers: Reconciliation in Transitional Societies, 35 Colum.
Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 661, 721 (2004) (noting that individual amnesties are more likely to
overcome suspicions of impunity).
80

See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17(1)(b); see also Robinson, supra note 57, at 500

(remarking that an interpretation of “investigation” to be a criminal investigation would only
allow deference to truth and reconciliation efforts under the “interests of justice” analysis of
Article 53); Stahn, supra note 55, at 711 (arguing that a broader reading of Article 17 would
likely allow truth and reconciliation programs in the mold of the South African TRC, in which a
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commission may absolve an offender only if it conditioned exemption from criminal
responsibility upon testimony as to the facts of the crime and the offender’s own conduct).
81

See Amnesty Act, supra note 10, pt. 2 (merely requiring an amnesty seeker to report to the

authorities, renounce involvement in the hostilities, and surrender weapons); see also Robinson,
supra note 57, at 500 (maintaining that the Court could find a valid investigation when it is based
on certain criteria, such as sufficiency of evidence, seriousness of the conduct, and role of the
perpetrator).
82

See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17(2)(a); see also Sarkin, supra note 79, at 709 (asserting

that in order to meet the high threshold of inadmissibility, a state must satisfy Article 17(b)’s
strict conditions).
83

See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17(2)(a); see also Arsanjani, supra note 4, at 66

(contending that conditional amnesty enforces the perception of amnesty as a contract – valid
only to the extent that both parties comply with its terms); Sarkin, supra note 79, at 721
(remarking that only conditional amnesties, in which a state exchanges its discretion to punish
for a compelling state interest, will sufficiently link the non-punishment of crimes and
democracy); Stahn, supra note 55, at 714 (remarking that a Peruvian amnesty law which barred
investigation and prosecution of members of its military forces would likely not meet the Article
17(2)(a) requirement because it infers a state’s intent to “shield” from criminal responsibility).
Some experts maintain that Article 17(1)(b)’s mandate that a state, in order to satisfy
complementarity, “decided” not to prosecute also implies that amnesty grants must be
conditional upon the completion of a specific procedure, allowing the decision maker to
determine if the offender has met certain criteria to be exempted from criminal responsibility.
See Stahn, supra note 55, at 712.
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84

See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17; see also Amnesty Act, supra note 10, pt. 2 (granting

immunity in exchange for the amnesty seeker’s surrender and renouncement of the rebellion);
Sarkin, supra note 79, at 721 (arguing that a state should not grant amnesty for nothing, or in
return for a pre-existing legal duty, like obeying the law).
85

See TRC Report, supra note 32, vol. 6, § 1, ch. 5, ¶ 1 (remarking that the South African largely

successful amnesty process was not blanket but conditional, requiring that offenders publicly
declare human rights violations before they could receive an amnesty grant); see also Stahn,
supra note 55, at 721 (remarking that as each state’s circumstances and conditions will be
unique, the country should determine on its own compelling state interests).
86

See Forgotten Voices, supra note 9, at 29 (finding that 56% of Ugandans would require

apologies from amnestied individuals, while 34% would demand that the perpetrator confess to
their wrongdoing before accepting them back into the community).
87

See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17(1)(b); see also Robinson, supra note 57, at 500

(observing that it would be inaccurate to deem a prosecution barred by legislation as a “decision”
not to prosecute); Stahn, supra note 55, at 711-23 (observing that alternative forums of justice
with the power to recommend judicial prosecution and deny amnesties after the completion of a
investigative procedure would likely meet the requirements of the Article 17(2)).
88

See Amnesty Act, supra note 10, pt. 2 (permitting the Minister to give a Certification of

Amnesty without any investigative mechanisms into the facts of the offender’s crimes).
89

See Robinson, supra note 57, at 501 (observing that even if one called a legislative amnesty as

a “decision,” it would be difficult to refute the fact that the state’s intent was to shield
perpetrators).
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90

See Amnesty Act, supra note 10, pt. 2 (prohibiting prosecution or “any form of punishment” of

those offenders who sought, and were granted, amnesty).
91

See Amnesty Act, supra note 10, pmbl. (declaring that it is the desire of the government to

implement its amnesty policy in order to “establish peace, security, and tranquility throughout
the country”); see also Robinson, supra note 57, at 501 (remarking that even if one characterized
the principal intent of an amnesty program as to promote reconciliation, the means of such an act
are certainly, at least in large part, to shield perpetrators).
92

See Rome Statue, supra note 3, arts. 17(1)(d), 53(2)(c); see also Stahn, supra note 55, at 707

(asserting that since the “gravity of the crime” is a guiding factor in both the admissibility test of
Article 17(1)(d) and the Prosecutor’s assessment to investigate and prosecute under Article 53,
there is room to differentiate between more serious and less serious crimes).
93

See Rome Statute, supra note 3, pmbl.

94

See Stahn, supra note 55, at 708 (setting forth the limitations to international criminal

prosecution in the ad hoc tribunals of Yugoslavia and Rwanda).
95

See Uprooted and Forgotten, supra note 4, at 8 (describing the insufficient resources of the

Ugandan legal system, including understaffed courts, inexperienced judges, the dearth of
qualified lawyers in Gulu, and the prohibitive costs of private litigation). But see Akhavan,
supra note 52, at 415 (observing that Uganda still possesses a viable and independent judicial
system).
96

See Rome Statue, supra note 3, art. 53(2)(c).

97

See Akhavan, supra note 52, at 420 (noting the immediate tangible consequences of the ICC’s

threats of prosecution to the top LRA leadership).
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98

See Ssenyonjo, supra note 8, at 427 (remarking that if the ICC were to take precedence over

Ugandan national laws, even amnesty grantees could be subject to ICC prosecution, rendering
the Amnesty Act ineffectual).
99

See Roche, supra note 53, at 574 (noting that perpetrators who are aware that any admission

could become the basis of an ICC prosecution may gain an additional incentive to forsake an
amnesty and continue fighting).
100

See id. (suggesting that withholding prosecuting to perpetrators who have already been

granted amnesty would make amnesties more valuable, solidifying the amnesties’ value); see
also Ssenyonjo, supra note 8, at 427 (recommending that the ICC, given its mandate of ending
impunity of perpetrators of international crimes, must bring to justice LRA’s top officers who are
responsible for committing the gravest crimes).
101

See Scharf, supra note 19, at 188 (arguing that the failure to prosecute the Armenian massacre

sent a message to the Nazis that they could effectively get away with genocidal policies).
102

See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17.

103

See id. art. 53(1)(c) (mandating the Prosecutor to consider the “gravity of the crime” in

determining whether to initiate an investigation); see also Clark, supra note 17, at 389 (stating
that the ICC is determined to end impunity for perpetrators of genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity by requiring the Prosecutor to take cases even when states are reluctant to do so
on their own).
104

See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 53(2)(c); see also Stahn, supra note 55, at 718 (arguing

that the Court will likely determine that validation of an automatic amnesty for the most serious
perpetrators is contrary to the purpose of the Rome Statue).
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105

See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 53; see also Stahn, supra note 55, at 717 (stating the

principle of Article 17 is that there must be unusual circumstances to defer investigations or
prosecutions).
106

See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17(2)(c); see also Stahn, supra note 55, at 718

(concluding that it is unlikely that drafters of the Rome Statute intended Article 53 to allow
general consideration of national reconciliation or peacemaking goals).
107

See Sarkin, supra note 79, at 691-92 (positing that reconciliation enhances justice insofar as

authentic reconciliation allows similar results as does punitive justice – vindication and
restitution); see also Erin Daly, Transformative Justice: Charting a Path to Reconciliation, 12
Int’l Legal Persp. 73, 133 (2002) (observing that since justice requires truth and truth requires
the promise of amnesty, amnesty is indeed an essential part of justice).
108

See Roche, supra note 53, at 578 (noting that one of the principal factors encouraging

apartheid victims to seek justice within the South African TRC was the prospect of financial
reparation).
109

See Daly, supra note 107, at 132 (explaining South Africa’s Constitutional Court’s reasoning

for upholding the TRC’s amnesty provision: offenders are given the necessary incentive to come
forward with the truth, which victims seek so desperately, with the knowledge that they will be
immune from punishment).
110

See Sarkin, supra note 79, at 692 (stating that broader notions of justice and reconciliation can

lead to healing, both on a societal and individual level).
111

See Daly, supra note 109, at 133 (pointing out that offenders would have no incentive to

apply for amnesty without the specter of criminal prosecution, as evidenced by perpetrators who
abstained from amnesty in South Africa).
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112

See Sarkin, supra note 79, at 694 (observing that prosecutorial discretion would benefit

reconciliation in a post-conflict state where the judicial system would prosecute members of only
group).
113

See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 53(2)(c) (ordering the Prosecutor to consider “all the

circumstances” when deciding whether prosecuting a case would be “in the interests of justice”).
114

See Prosecutor v. Kallon & Kamara, Case Nos. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), SCSL-2004-16-

AR72(E), Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty, ¶ 71 (Mar. 13, 2004)
(maintaining that states may not grant amnesty for crimes of international jurisdiction).
115

See id. ¶ 59 (relating the Defense’s argument that the Prosecutor may have offered de facto

immunity to some individuals who allegedly committed similar crimes as the defendants as a
result of their cooperation with the Prosecutor); see also Schabas, supra note 36, at 166
(observing that the Special Court’s modest budget, temporal restrictions to acts committed after
November of 1996, and limited jurisdiction against those that “bear the greatest responsibility for
serious violations,” suggested that the United Nations was effectively encouraging amnesty for
the majority of perpetrators).
116

See Schabas, supra note 36, at 166 (remarking that in a conflict in which thousands of

individuals were likely guilty of committing inhumane acts, the difference between the position
of the United Nations and that manifested in the Lomé Agreement amounted to only several
individuals).
117

See generally Uprooted and Forgotten, supra note 4, at 7-11 (describing the limited judicial

resources of northern Uganda, including understaffed courts, lack of police presence, and
shortage of qualified lawyers).
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118

See Robinson, supra note 57, at 505 (noting that in order for an alternative procedure to meet

the complementarity test, it would have to be a sophisticated procedure with certain prosecutorial
features).
119

See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17(1)(a),(b); see also Roche, supra note 53, at 568

(observing that even if the ICC finds that a truth commission is an investigation, it does not
necessarily constitute a formal prosecution).
120

See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17(2) (ordering the Court, in determining unwillingness,

to consider whether one or more of the following factors are present: the proceedings were
undertaken “for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility,”
there was an “unjustified delay in the proceedings,” or the proceedings were not “conducted
independently or impartially”).
121

See Stahn, supra note 55, at 710 (interpreting Article 17’s clauses foreclosing prosecution

where “the case has been investigated by a State...and the State has decided not to prosecute the
person concerned” as perhaps providing room for inadmissibility when a truth commission has
investigated a crime or where criminal proceedings lead to symbolic punishment); see Roche,
supra note 53, at 568 (maintaining that truth commissions are not based on an “unwillingness” to
prosecute because their purpose, it can be argued, is to promote the restorative concept of justice
through the uncovering of the truth and reconciliatory necessities). But see Dugard, supra note 3,
at 702 (arguing that it is difficult to argue that a state’s decision to forego prosecution and grant
amnesty after an investigation did not result from prosecutorial “unwillingness” when the state in
fact decided not to prosecute).
122

See Roche, supra note 53, at 568-69 (remarking that given the formidable challenges facing

post-conflict societies, states who choose to institute a truth commission may decide to exchange
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some retributive justice – at least to those offenders to whom a judicial body has granted
legitimate amnesty – in order to promote other important objectives, including “uncovering the
truth, assisting victims, and promoting reconciliation and reconstruction”).
123

See Goldstein-Bolocan, supra note 18, at 364 (explaining that the TRC’s narrative process

"gave victims a chance to relate their suffering, thus providing them with the specific
acknowledgment and vindication they had long been denied and in most cases, with cathartic and
psychologically beneficial effects”). But see Policy Paper, supra note 61, at 19 (arguing that the
ICC must only consider the victims’ interests as they relate to the purposes of Article 53 –
including determining the identities of the perpetrators, hearing the perpetrator’s explanation,
and seeing perpetrators punished).
124

See Robinson, supra note 57, at 505 (explaining that exceptional circumstances may render a

rigid prosecutorial approach harmful to the local community).
125

See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 53(2)(c); see also Promotion of National Unity and

Reconciliation Act 1995, pmbl. (S. Afr.) [hereinafter Reconciliation Act] (providing that one
purpose of the amnesty grant is to make recommendations to prevent future offenses against
human rights); Roche, supra note 53, at 574 (observing that the success of South Africa’s TRC
illustrates that amnesties can provide enduring peace if a truth commission administers them
properly). Further, truth commissions ensure that the “parallel truths” of perpetrators are
addressed and corrected, helping to understand the cognitive process of the tragedy and to
correct misconceptions in public discourse for future generations. Id. at 571.
126

See Reconciliation Act, supra note 125, pmbl.( relating the Grant’s intent to “promote

rehabilitation and restoration of the human and civil dignity of victims of human rights
violations”); see also Goldstein-Bloom, supra note 18, at 364 (stating the TRC collected
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testimonies from about 24,000 victims of human rights abuses, thereby creating a social truth as
to the circumstances and impact of the abuses); Roche, supra note 53, at 571 (explaining that
perpetrators tend to dispose of evidence of their crime, including often burying bodies in mass
graves).
127

See TRC report, supra note 32, vol. 6, § 1, ch. 5, ¶ 37 (maintaining that “the amnesty process

made a meaningful contribution to a better understanding of the causes, nature, and extent of the
conflict... [allowing] unique insight into the perspectives and motives of those who committed
gross violations of human rights”); see also Roche, supra note 53, at 571 (noting that testimony
of offenders was crucial to the success of South Africa’s TRC investigation, helping to identify
secret burial sites, conduct exhumations, and provide dignified reburials); Sarkin, supra note 79,
at 721 (maintaining that participation in a truth and reconciliation process symbolizes the
perpetrator’s willingness to play a role in the new order).
128

See Daly, supra note 32, at 106 (remarking that criminal prosecution is unlikely to

successfully deter in post-conflict societies because it does not address the causes of the crimes
and because trials only address the leaders of the prior regime, without attempting to change the
society as a whole to one that does not tolerate such crimes); see also Goldstein-Bloom, supra
note 18, at 360 (noting that granting justice-making ability solely to lawyers and administrators
may leave victims unsatisfied).
129

See Roche, supra note 53, at 575 (proposing that a truth commission “could assist the ICC by

passing on any evidence it collected in the course of its own work”).
130

See Stafford, supra note 22, at 136 (relating that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of

the Lomé Peace Agreement was critical in providing a restorative forum for victims and
perpetrators to complement the Special Court)
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131

See Singer, supra note 8, at 580 (relating that Sierra Leone placed children accused of grave

crimes in special closed juvenile hearings and provided counseling and other assistance).
132

See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 53(2)(c) (ordering the Prosecutor to consider “the age or

infirmity of the alleged perpetrator” when deciding if there is a sufficient basis for prosecution);
see also UNHCHR Report, supra note 49 (recognizing that since the overwhelming majority of
LRA fighters are, or used to be child soldiers, it is unlikely that the Prosecutor would prosecute
for crimes they committed while they were under abduction).
133

See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 53(2)(c); see also Statute for the Special Court for Sierra

Leone art. 7(1), Jan. 16, 2000, U.N. Doc. 5/2002/246, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/scslstatute.html (last visited June 29, 2006) (declaring that the Special Court “shall have no
jurisdiction over any person who was under the age of 15 at the time of the alleged commission
of the crime”). Further, the Statue instructed the Court to treat alleged perpetrators who were
fifteen to eighteen at the time of the crime with dignity to assist in their reintegration in society.
Id.
134

See Dugard, supra note 3, at 703 (remarking that allowing sentence mitigation would preserve

the integrity of the ICC, which seeks to promote accountability for the commission of
international crimes).
135

See Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. ICC-

ASP/1/3, Rule 145(2)(a) (2002), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/
officialjournal/Rules_of_Proc_and_Evid_070704-EN.pdf (last visited March 5, 2006) (listing
non-exhaustive mitigating factors including “conduct after the act,” “efforts to compensate the
victim” and “cooperation with the Court”).
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136

See Akhavan, supra note 52, at 418 (proposing that the ICC could offer mitigated sentencing

to top LRA members, in the highly unlikely event they are willing to capitulate); see also Stahn,
supra note 55, at 718 (proposing that while cooperation with a truth commission would not be a
determinative factor in whether to prosecute, it should be a mitigating sentencing factor).
137

See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 21 (Mar. 5,

1998) (ruling that the defendant’s voluntary surrender was a mitigating factor due to the
important need to encourage other perpetrators to come forward).
138

See Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3, Sentence, ¶ 473 (Dec. 6, 1999) (holding

that the defendant’s high position, knowledge, and conscious participation in crimes outweighed
mitigating factors including his assistance to certain individuals and his poor health); see also
Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 62 (Sept. 4, 1998)
(ruling that the defendant’s aggravating circumstances, including his high ministerial post,
offsets his cooperation with the Prosecutor and his guilty plea).
139

See Arrest Warrant, supra note 14 (describing the charges against the LRA’s top leaders,

including rape, murder, enslavement, sexual enslavement, forced enlisting of children).
140

See David Blair, I Killed So Many I Lost Count, Says Boy, 11, Thousands of Children Have

Been Taken By a Ugandan Cult and Forced to Join in Mass Murder. Now the Net is Closing on
the Fanatic Responsible, Daily Telegraph, Aug. 3, 2005, at 12 (observing that although in
theory, Uganda’s amnesty grant would apply to Kony, an ICC arrest warrant would relinquish
the grant, thus deterring Kony from surrendering).
141

See discussion supra Part I.A.3 (setting forth mitigating and aggravating sentencing factors

developed by the ICTR and ICTY).
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142

See Uprooted and Forgotten, supra note 4, at 15 (calling for a broader truth-seeking process to

supplement ICC investigation, in order to investigate crimes not within ICC jurisdiction); see
also Roche, supra note 53, at 579 (proposing a cooperative approach in future cases in which the
ICC would prosecute perpetrators who fail to satisfy the conditions of a truth commission
amnesty grant).
143

See Roche, supra note 53, at 574 (arguing that this approach would thereafter make amnesties

more valuable and encourage offenders to seek amnesty).
144

See Arrest Warrants, supra note 14 (declaring that the Prosecutor’s mandate is to investigate

and prosecute those who bear the greatest responsibility for crimes against humanity and war
crimes).
145

See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 53(2)(c)(instructing the Prosecutor to consider the

“interests of justice” and the “interests of justice” when making prosecutorial decisions); see also
Robinson, supra note 57, at 495 (noting that many advocates for prosecuting all offenders of
international crimes concede a possible exception where insistence on prosecution would trigger
additional hostilities).
146

See Robinson, supra note 57, at 495 (remarking that granting amnesty to architects of mass

atrocities would be especially problematic).
147

See Uprooted and Forgotten, supra note 4, at 13 (recommending that the Ugandan judicial

system prosecute perpetrators of both Ugandan and international law, including crimes
committed prior to Uganda’s ratification of the Rome Statute in July 2002); see also Stahn, supra
note 55 (suggesting that Article 17 seems to prohibit amnesty grants which exempt certain
governmental forces from prosecution).
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148

See Goldstein-Bolocan, supra note 18, at 365-66 (maintaining that although many criticized

the TRC for its failure to provide adequate reparation to apartheid victims by letting those
responsible for crimes escape with impunity, this underscored the weaknesses of the South
African legal system rather than the TRC amnesty program).
149

See Uprooted and Forgotten, supra note 4, at 11 (recommending that international donors

should support, in the form of earmarked funds, the Ugandan Human Rights Commission, a
national judicial body that investigates and hears individual cases against the government army
that is currently under-funded and understaffed); see also Eric Stover & Marieke Wierda,
...[W]hich Should Prevail, Int’l Herald Tribune, Oct. 15, 2005 available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/10/14/opinion/
ed/stover.php (last visited Jan. 20, 2006) (observing that financial and logistical international
support would allow Uganda’s criminal justice system to try perpetrators for serious crimes not
covered by ICC indictments).
150

See Roche, supra note 53, at 575 (remarking that individual sanction of amnesty from a truth

commission is vital to the legitimacy of the amnesty program).
151

See id. at 576 (noting that a state would only be able to argue for an ICC prosecution bar in

cases where a truth commission grants amnesties individually based on strict, transparent
criteria).
152

See id. at 575 (commenting that, under a cooperative approach, the ICC would need to be

certain that the truth commission adequately fostered truth, reparation, and reconciliation
interests).
153

See id. (discussing the policy of the Prosecutor for the Special Court of Sierra Leone -- to

encourage all parties to go before the truth commission and tell their story without fear of
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reprisal but reserving the power to indict the witness through information that the commission
did not compel the witness to provide); see also TRC Report, supra note 32, vol. 6, § 1, ch. 1
(declaring that the TRC amnesty applicant was protected against disclosure or her amnesty
application in subsequent criminal proceedings and the prosecution was barred from using facts
from the application).
154

See Rome Statute, supra note 20, art. 17(2)(c) (mandating that the ICC, in determining

unwillingness of a state to prosecute, shall consider whether the state did not conduct the
proceedings “independently or impartially”); see also Stahn, supra note 55, at 713 (noting that
“[q]uasi-judicial mechanisms should be…. sufficiently independent of the state and sufficiently
impartial in their decision-making process, in order to be recognized as forums of justice barring
proceedings before the Court”).
155

See Daly, supra note 32, at 389 (explaining that individual amnesty was vital in the Rwandan

case due to misconceptions that all perpetrators of genocide were Hutu).
156

See Roche, supra note 53, at 576 (observing that an unconditional blanket amnesty would be

illegal, and would remain susceptible to ICC prosecution); see also Forgotten Voices, supra note
9, at 29 (finding that only four percent of Ugandan polled respondents would support an
unconditional amnesty before the community accepts the perpetrator back into the community).
157

See Forgotten Voices, supra note 9, at 29 (listing survey participants’ proposed requirements

in exchange for granting amnesty to perpetrators, including apologizing (56%), confessing
wrongdoing (34%), and subjecting themselves to trial (13%)).
158

See id. at 37 (finding that 52% of Ugandans believe the perpetrator should provide food to

victims, and 40% would require food as compensation). Further investigation of appropriate
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restitution would be helpful to assist a truth and reconciliation commission determine the fairest
price for amnesty according to Ugandans themselves. Id. at 6.
159

See Stahn, supra note 55, at 712 (observing that Article 17(1)(b)’s inadmissibility requirement

that the case must have resulted in a “decision” of a state not to prosecute suggests that the
drafters intended a person to be exempt from criminal responsibility only after meeting certain
specified criteria).
160

See Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 7(1), Jan. 16, 2000, U.N. Doc.

5/2002/246, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-statute.html (last visited June 29, 2006)
(prohibiting the Court from trying alleged perpetrators under 15 and requiring discretion for
those who were fifteen to eighteen at the time of the alleged crime); see also Singer, supra note 8,
at 580 (stating that the goal of deterrence is diminished where, due to the child’s age and duress
by threats and drugs, there is less awareness).
161

See id. (describing the strategy of the Sierra Leone Special Court in which the Court allowed

hearings for children accused of particularly heinous crimes in closed juvenile chambers, and
provided psychological counseling and other forms of assistance).
162

See Ssenyonjo, supra note 8, at 411-12 (observing that over eighty-five percent of LRA’s

forces are made up of children).
163

See Jo Becker, Children as Weapons of War, Human Rights Watch World Report (2004),

available at http://www.hrw.org/wr2k4/
11.htm (last visited June 29, 2006) (relating that the most active effort at pursuing children
recruitment cases was seen in Sierra Leone’s Special Court, in which a specialist in child rights
issues was appointed to investigate recruitment and abduction crimes).
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164

See id. (arguing for stronger efforts to address impunity because recruiters are seldom held

accountable in countries where child soldiers are prevalent).
165

See Akhavan, supra note 52, at 419 (proposing that if top LRA are willing to surrender, the

terms of negotiations could include mitigated sentencing in exchange for voluntary surrender);
see also Stahn, supra note 55, at 704 (suggesting that a perpetrator’s voluntarily surrender under
an amnesty-peace deal may constitute a mitigating circumstance).
166

See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 21 (Mar. 5,

1998) (holding that based on the ICTY’s “duty, through its judicial functions, to contribute to the
settlement of the wider issues of accountability, reconciliation and establishing the truth behind
the evils perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia,” “appropriate” weight must be given for an
accused’s voluntary surrender).
167

See Akhavan, supra note 52, at 418 (observing that in northern Uganda, many LRA members
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